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History and Policy: The Case of Iraq
Bruce Kuklick
1  The decision by Americans to go to war against Iraq has appeared to be such a colossal
mistake that it has called forth many condemnations by historically minded intellectuals.
Most have condemned the hubris  and historical  insouciance of  the administration of
George Bush. Few historians think that the President resembles Abraham Lincoln, guiding
his country through a necessarily difficult but morally majestic period. Rather, we are
told,  history  directs  us  to  other  policy  choices  and  will  mercilessly  appraise  these
Republican statesmen. What is the connection between history and policy-making? What
is the role of the historian, qua historian, in contributing to today’s appraisals? These
questions require far more consideration than they have been given, because scholars
have oversimplified historical evaluations of American policies in the attempt to show the
current leadership in the United States to be uniquely clumsy or malign. Moreover, in
their zeal to condemn the war, historically minded academics have fallen into confusion
about the nature of historical knowing. Examining these issues is complex, and requires
some extended analysis. 
2 Consider this extraordinary aspect of historical study, mostly unnoticed by practicing
historians: they presuppose that the sort of understanding they garner only emerges at a
later  time,  only  subsequent  to  the  occurrence  of  an  event  they  are  studying.  For
professional  historians,  even  the  writing  of  ‘recent’  or  ‘contemporary’  history
necessitates the passage of twenty to thirty years. Part of this necessity stems from the
need to base history on documents, which are usually only made available long after
something has happened. Historians presume more importantly that matters make sense,
that insight is generated, when the historians construe the events they study as part of a
larger whole. This whole in some measure only becomes such after the events have taken
place, with ‘historical perspective’ as historians like to say. Historical knowledge does not
just get wrested from sources. It materializes in time, later than the happenings of which
we have historical knowledge.  I could not have historical knowledge of, say, the Vietnam
War in the 1960s in the 1960s.  I will only be able to gain it sometime after the War is over.
Historical knowledge depends on its elements having a certain temporal order. I may
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recollect today how I felt in 1964 when Lyndon Johnson announced an air strike against
North Vietnam: “I remember telling the lady I worked with, ‘This guy is going to get us
into a war.’” But historical knowledge about the war requires that the historian enumerate
the evolution of troop increases, from say, 1954 to 1966, so that we can say that there is
escalation.  Such a procedure can only take place after some time has gone by and the
events that we are examining fit into a pattern. History has a synthetic dimension. 
3 Historical knowledge presupposes activities that exhibit motivation or purpose or some
kind of functional rationality. Persons in communities display these sorts of intentional
activities but so too can communities themselves: historical individuals such as groups,
organizations,  institutions,  cultures,  nations.1 Historical  studies  reveal  this  kind  of
intentionality but can do so only as it comes into view through some era or stage. We
comprehend matters in categories that make sense only as we see people acting over
time, as they reveal who and what they are in the temporal unraveling of circumstance. 
4 A  number  of  peculiar  characteristics  of  historical  knowledge  flow  from  and  are
intertwined with its sprouting over time.2  The pertinent individuals, from persons to
nations, frequently do not grasp, according to historians, the fruition of their intent in
the world, nor may persons at a given time be aware themselves of the culmination or
abandoning of the aims of the historical individuals.  Historians may not want to lose
contact with standard, non-historical, approaches to grasping intent, but viewing events
as part of  a larger teleological  whole that has ended by the present of  the historian
enriches such a grasp. Historians produce such enrichment because they will  give an
account of their subjects in which processes, persons, and historical individuals mature. 
5  Take the clash of nation states, which always have interests or purposes. In the study of
such political history the philosopher Hegel got at the problem when he spoke of “the
cunning of reason.” Hegel noted that political struggles abounded with contesting and
only semi-understood selfish designs, many of which seemed to cancel one another out.
Yet, he claimed, the result advanced a greater end that the politicians involved never
fully  understood.3  Historical  accounts  often  transmute  the  conscious  goals  into
something  other  than  what  their  originators  wanted.   Historians  less  theoretically
disposed than Hegel commonly talk about these matters as expressing historical irony.
Matters turn out topsy-turvy  --  people get the opposite of what they try to achieve;
winners often wind up losing; failure is sometimes transmuted into success. 
6 We commonly grasp the coming-to-pass aspect of historical knowledge by seeing historical
accounts as narratives, or even stories in which an event appears as an ingredient; the
event has a role in an account. Historians often speak of the meaning or significance of an
event, and they are alluding to the role of the event in the account. They can’t define the
role until they figure out the account in which the event will appear, and this can’t be
figured out until some later time. Historical knowledge of the present is not available in
the present. 
7 As an aspect of their work historians want to grasp the intent of actors, and to see the
world from the perspective of these actors,  but this amounts to a paradoxical effort.
Historians work from a viewpoint -- their own present -- denied to the actors. Historians
can ascertain the intent of the people in the past in ways that the actors do not have
accessible. An historical account of what past people were about will embrace attention to
their understanding of their intent but also transcend this understanding. 
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8 Woodrow Wilson could not designate himself as initiating an American foreign policy
impulse that would later have the doubtful  connotation Wilsonian.  Nor could Lyndon
Johnson  understand  in  1964  that  subsequent  historians  might  correctly  describe  his
efforts as those of a failed Wilsonian. Wilson could not know he was starting a tradition,
and in 1964 LBJ had not yet failed. 
9 As a form of knowing, history must differ from that kind of knowing available to policy
makers in the present. It is logically impossible that they could see themselves as an
historian would, and it is equally impossible for observers in the present to see the world
as  the historians will  see it  when they see it  as  the past.   Historical  knowledge also
requires that the actors be seen not as they see themselves but as others see them, and is
thus never autobiographical.  We can never have historical knowledge of ourselves. We
could not, apriori, have an idea of what we were doing as historical figures, let us say of
what our aims are in all their convolutions, how these aims appear to others, how others
might rightly oppose them, and how things will turn out. We cannot learn these things
until we become the objects of history, and can be exposed to the pitiless inspection with
which historians scrutinize the past. 
10 In their cruelty, historical knowledge and the knowledge that others have of us are closer
kin to one another than the knowledge we have of ourselves.  Anyone who has gone to a
dinner  party  and  spoken  of  absent  acquaintances  must  understand  the  difference
between the way people appear to themselves and the way others regularly describe
them.  We judge the calculations, motives, moral decision-making and even minor foibles
of individuals far more ruthlessly than do the individuals concerned.  I here make not just
an empirical observation about dinner parties and history. Civility involves the delicate
dialectic that militates against our telling others what we think of them, in return for
which they do the same for us in order to make social life possible. Civility is never mere
civility.   People could not function if  they understood themselves the way others do.
Historians lack civility in their treatment of their subjects.
11 Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine Woodrow Wilson immediately after
the American declaration of war against Germany in the spring of 1917 and after America
associates itself with the Western Allies, Britain and France.  Wilson receives historical
knowledge of himself. He learns that his entire rationale for waging the war will become
unhinged. The United States will never involve itself with his pet project, the new and
proposed League of Nations; his vision of a world of global democracies will never come
to  fruition  and  indeed  Fascism  and  Communism  will  fiercely  challenge  democracy.
 Wilson also learns that he will suffer a debilitating stroke in campaigning for his ideas in
America.  But if  he also learns that a second World War will  follow his failed efforts,
someone argues,  perhaps Wilson will  be energized to fight even harder for American
entry into the League.  On the other side, many historians contend that the failure of the
United States to commit itself to the League of Nations had little to do with the crucial
issues of the next twenty years, mainly the rise of an avenging Germany. On the contrary,
the agreements at the peace conference held at Versailles in 1919 resulted in the harsh
peace toward Germany and produced the Nazis. Should Wilson not work to mitigate the
punitive  aspects  of  the  peacemaking  at  the  Conference  that  were  directed  against
Germany? But if Wilson successfully were to push uncompromisingly for a peace that
would re-integrate Germany into a place of power in Central Europe, would that not
convince the Germans they were not really defeated, and spur them to another effort at
hegemony in Europe? On hearing the historical news, does Wilson fear for his health?4 
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12 Just conjecture that Wilson gains this sort of knowledge that can only come into being in
the future, and in a crucial moment elects to change course. It is January 1918, and he
decides not to give the famous Fourteen Points address that elaborated on his reformist
and idealistic peace program. But Wilson has strangely gained historical knowledge; it
rests on what has already taken place. Is it then inevitable that he must still develop his
peace program? Must things be as history tells us they were?  The President appears
before the American Congress assembled and finds himself -- against his will? -- saying:
“The  First  of  the  Fourteen  Points  …Open  covenants  openly  arrived  at…,”  as  he
simultaneously struggles unsuccessfully to voice his new sentiments.
13 Focus not on Wilson but on all the diplomatic and military leaders at Versailles. Would
they have been able to negotiate had they the knowledge of how they would appear when
the standard books about the diplomacy of World War One were published in the 1960s
and after? Can we even figure out what it what would it mean for them to have this kind
of knowledge?  They acted in 1918-1919, they thought, in such a way as to avoid war.  How
could the diplomats grapple with the historical notion that their shortsighted behavior
began a story that led to another war? The historian surely cannot say that they intended
to promote a future war, but we could not rule out that their “real” intent was not to
prohibit a war but to promote short-term gains without regard to the likelihood of war.
14  This speculative exercise gives the lie to any belief that present individuals can have
historical  knowledge  of  their  situation,  and  shows  that  the  unknotting  of  intent  by
historians is a complex affair.
15 Historical knowledge gives insight into the ends of action but can conflict with what I call
actor-knowledge. Agency requires the point of view of the actor -- a ‘decider’ if you will;
historical knowledge requires more the view of a spectator.5  On the one hand, actor-
knowledge will  wrongly understand what is  going on if  contrasted to the knowledge
generated with temporal  perspective.   The historian presumes that  knowledge of  the
present,  in the present,  is  in some way fundamentally flawed. On the other hand, as
Friedrich  Nietzsche  pointed  out  a  long  time  ago  in  his  work  on  history,  historical
knowledge may make the bearer of that knowledge ill, unable to do work in the world.
Such knowledge has the tendency of diminishing a sense of the efficacious and desirable
nature of outcomes chosen.6   Historically immersed individuals might be less able to act
because they would not know for twenty or thirty years whether what they had decided
to do was correct, and perhaps not even then.  And maybe things would have been the
same, even had the protagonists behaved differently. Historians are hard pressed to judge
that alternative courses of action would have had better effects, or that human persons
had much latitude in choosing what to do. A deep knowledge of history, for Nietzsche,
can make one sick.
16 Nietzsche may be hyperbolic, but he recognized that matters are complex for historians
and more than usually ambiguous. 
17 The war has called forth an ocean of quasi-academic writing, much of it in the form of
instant historical analysis. It purports to show that even a rudimentary understanding of
American foreign policy could have alerted statesmen and politicians in the United States
to the disastrous implications of deciding to go to war. This literature also now makes a
raft of putative historical judgments, e.g., that George Bush will ‘go down in history’ as
the worst president that America has produced. Here is what is troubling: commentators
who  presume  to  be  grounded  in  history  have  gone  beyond  the  limits  of  historical
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thinking. In their rush to judge and to show the administration’s faulty decision-making,
they have additionally vulgarized the history of American foreign policy into a series of
easily  accessible  lessons  about  what  should  and  should  not  be  done.   Similarly
overwrought discussions that purported to be scholarly took place during the Vietnam
War. International crises do not bring out the best in academics. 
18 According to a common professional  view of  the early 21st  century,  the war in Iraq
represents at least a monumental misperception by American policy makers, evidencing
not  just  a  blunder  but  also  overweening  entitlement  and  a  grotesque  belief  in  the
correctness of  the path of  the United States.  The most recent makers of  policy have
overstepped  the  bounds  of  realism;  they  suffer  from  a  unique  sense  of  American
exceptionalism, and lack a fundamental ethical balance.7  Commentators even suggest
that the United States may be slipping into a ‘fundamentalist’ ‘jihadist’ position that has
‘fascistic’ overtones in its zealotry and lack of prudence.  The well known conservative
policy analysts associated with the White Houses when it was inhabited by Ronald Reagan
and now George Bush have nurtured this constellation of obligations. Yet many critics of
the  war  finally  add  that  these  same  Republicans  have had  crucial  help  from  non-
conservative intellectuals.  The real firepower that has generated the commitments in
Iraq, the common critics say, has come from theorists of worldwide democracy situated
on the left and generally supposed to be devoted to the Democratic Party.  These “Neo
Wilsonian” purveyors of nation building, global law, and human rights have put forward
ideas that conservatives have literally high jacked for use in Iraq.  Indeed, liberal political
theorists and political scientists in the United States have written much about what steps
the United States has to take to achieve a responsible,  humane foreign policy in the
Middle  East.  They  helped  to  provide  the  prescriptions  and  ideas  that  conservative
ideologues have cashed in in Iraq. Both the large number of critics and the increasingly
beleaguered  intellectual  spokespersons  for  the  Bush administration have  fed  on  one
another in the attempt to refute the position of their opponents and to shore up their
own inclinations. Each group has ransacked the history of American foreign policy to find
justifications for what that side has done in the present, or what it has wanted to do. 
19 The above summary of the scholarly debate and the consensus on the value of history
tries to capture the vehemence, passion, and certainty of the writing. But I also want to
intimate that in my own nightmares about contemporary American diplomacy, I share the
feelings of fury and betrayal that many American and European students of diplomacy
have displayed.  But, dare I say it, feelings don’t cut it in scholarship.
20 We should not slight the demands of history. Why on earth should historians think that,
as  scholars,  they can make technicolor and definitive verdicts  about the war in Iraq
before it is even over? As citizens we surely can work ourselves into a rage about the
deficiencies of the Bush regime, certainly if we are Democrats in the United States, and
even if we are European intellectual observers with an investment in America. But as
academics searching for understanding, historians must surely know that when events
recede into the past, their valence changes. We cannot clearly see what the outcome of
this conflict will be, nor how historians will parse it. 
21 The flattened uncritical  version of  the  history  of  American foreign policy  that  even
historians have advanced under the duress of the war makes me even more suspicious of
the hasty verdict about the present strategy of the Bush administration in the Middle
East.  
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22 Many  American  liberal  internationalists  have  vehemently  criticized  the  Bush
administration but have also defended and still defend the main diplomatic initiatives
that  the  United  States  has  undertaken  in  its  rise  to  world  power.  They,  and  many
Europeans believe in an ‘American promise,’ while simultaneously distancing themselves
from present policy in the Middle East.  For these scholars the spread of democracy from
the eighteenth century has been an unalloyed good.  In the United States in the last
century the continuingly relevant commitments of Woodrow Wilson, the struggle against
the Nazis, and the long battle with the Soviet Union in the Cold War have forwarded
Enlightenment goals. The critical commentators even recognize that the formulators of
Iraq policy today have a heritage of ideas that joins up with these earlier successes of
American diplomacy, certainly in the commitment of the Bush administration to ‘nation
building.’    The  liberal  internationalists  see  themselves  as  promoting  democracy  in
ethnically homogeneous states, and their debt to Wilson’s grand vision is clear. They look
especially  at  the  reconstruction  of  Germany  and  Japan  after  World  War  Two,  the
movement for European integration that was initiated by the Marshall Plan, and even the
security interests that NATO came to embody.  All of these developments are perhaps too
easily associated with the global political ideals that Wilson promulgated, but whatever
exaggerations are possible in assessing Wilson’s  influence,  it  is  nonetheless true that
Wilson has left a permanent deposit in the American mind.  Simultaneously, the critical
scholars have found it easy to distinguish the beneficial peacekeeping that has been part
of the American past from the belligerent interventionism that they find in the current
regime in Washington.8   
23 Yet only a selective reading of the intellectual formulations of American policy in the past
and a cartoon version of the nation’s diplomatic history, can sustain this perspective. For
good or  ill,  the  politicians  in  power  today in  the  United States  are  much like  their
predecessors. 
24 For the formative period of the Cold War read carefully the Truman Doctrine Speech by
then  President  Harry  Truman  in  March  of  1947.  Truman  told  his  audience  of  the
emergence of a struggle between ‘the free world’ and it enemies and called for a global
contest between America and Russia.  George Kennan’s ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct,’
which was published shortly after Truman’s speech, has always been recognized as the
founding declaration of  American foreign policy  in  the  second-half  of  the  twentieth
century.  Kennan was more cerebral than Truman, but even more bellicose and given to
contrasts between good and evil. Kennan believed the Soviet adversary of the post-World
War Two period to be pathologically unhealthy, and the diplomat wanted the United
States to confront its opponent everywhere because “Providence” demanded action by
America.  The rhetoric of the other crucial operational document in the early years of the
Cold War, NSC-68 of 1950, was authored in part by the stalwart US statesman, Paul Nitze.
Nitze was as extreme as Truman and Kennan. His lengthy memorandum demanded a
planetary military mission by the United States in behalf of a righteous Christian polity.
  All of these statements propounded claims for American exceptionalism every bit as
outrageous as the many ex cathedra statements of George Bush on Iraq and on the role in
the world of the United States that liberal critics of the Bush administration love to quote.
25 We must, moreover, look squarely at the adventurism that accompanied some of this
rhetoric during the early part of the Cold War.  Examine the second part of the Korean
War. In the fall of 1950, after achieving the initial American purpose of turning back an
invasion by North Korea, the Americans marched to the north of Korea. Ignoring multiple
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warning of Chinese intervention, the United States dreamt of a rollback of communism,
part  of  the  promise  of  NSC-68.  The  incursion  resulted  in  an  ugly  and  unnecessary
expansion of Asian conflict. It would help us in comprehending Iraq to grasp the reckless
policy of Truman’s Democratic Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Do we even need to
mention the case of Vietnam, which falls within the logic of American foreign policy and
is often compared to Iraq? This was a foreign policy delivered to the world by liberal
Democrats  such  as  Robert  McNamara,  Dean  Rusk,  and  McGeorge  Bundy  as  heavily
involved in nation-building as Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheyney. 
26 In short, the history of American “Wilsonian” diplomacy is open to much interpretation,
and the Bush Doctrine fits right in with it. Or put it another way: if you don’t like the
Bush Doctrine, you should have a hard time swallowing many of the acts of American
assertiveness around the world in the last 100 years, and the justifications for these acts. 
27 Nonetheless, for policy-minded historians history is a batch of examples whose lessons
are clear and ready to use. They show how good we were then, and how bad we are now.
 This history teaching that we get from the many critics of American policy today is
dubious. The record is cloudier, the thinking and doing far more indistinct than those
scholars wishing to be policy-wonks would lead us to believe. One might even argue that
if one finds George Kennan’s ideas attractive, one should also find attractive the ideas of
Condolezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz. I would rather say that we find in any fair attention
to the historical  record many more complications than scholars have been willing to
acknowledge.  The record will surely not teach us to act in conformity with the moral
standards of liberal internationalists who want to praise most choices made in the Cold
War  but to condemn Iraq.
28 Perhaps more important, the oversimplified vision of the past goes along with a disregard
for the fact that as historians we must be enjoined not to assess the present now.  The
more historians get caught up in delivering pronouncements about current events, the
more they ignore the logical impropriety of presuming that our present understanding
can have the impartiality of historical knowledge. The historical disciplines embody an
important truth about the world of scholarship: there is a point to the detachment of the
Ivory Tower. But historical policymakers not only have a distorted idea of what history
can accomplish. In making it do service for contemporary events, they will degrade its
complex integrity.
29 The  standard  and  utterly  conventional  but  nonetheless  accepted  argument  for  the
importance of  the  study of  the  past  says  that  we learn from history.  The notion of
learning has a forceful aspect -- it pertains to changing the world of the present for the
better. All sort of commentators elaborate it in various ways. Karl Marx: we make our
own history  but  only  in  the  context  of  the  past  (and  thus  might  be  freed  of  some
constraints in the future if we attend to how the past works). George Santayana: those
who ignore the past condemn themselves to repeat it. John Maynard Keynes: practical
folks often unwittingly find themselves under the spell of some past purveyor of ideas
and (as Marx also believed) can liberate themselves with knowledge. 
30 Modern social scientists, committed to the amelioration of the human estate through the
use of a thorough empirical method have given the most lucid and compelling statement
of such ideas. These scholars believe that the careful accumulation of evidence combined
with  theoretical  sophistication  can  lead  to  warranted  generalizations  about  human
activity in society and politics that we may benignly use to solve social problems.  To
some extent we can reduce such problems to questions of effective administration and
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use the appropriate techniques of applied economics, sociology, or political science to
solve them.  
31 This mental picture of the social sciences usually brings with it a complementary one of
the role of history. It functions as a sort of field, or area, that social scientists can mine for
facts necessary to confirm or disconfirm theories that may be used to better the world, or
explain behavior. Some aspects of this view of history strike me as foolish: that historians
are bereft of conceptual ability, and that their unskilled labors basically generate a store
of usable, past facts for the use of more rigorous and analytically adept social scientists.
 But  this  false  view  has  its  grounds.   Historians,  in  general,  don’t  display  a  lot  of
imagination.  An empirical  quest  for  evidence  often nudges  aside  abstract  issues  and
governs much of what historical scholars do. Although this stereotype contains less truth
than it  did before the more or  less  new emphasis  on theory in history,  it  has some
resonance. And although social scientists don’t have much of an understanding of how
historians ascertain facts to be such, working historians do generate a factual basis for
their work. We should not be surprised that social scientists do not see the way the facts
are embedded in a larger creative process, and simply cannot be gleaned to assist them in
the construction of effective theories of human behavior. 
32 What does history accomplish if it does not help us to learn very much?  Here we can get
some help again from Nietzsche and a few other thinkers.9  When we need to act in the
present, according to them, we want to do the best we can and thus need to know exactly
how we are situated. The critical study of the past is most likely to help us out. History
arises from present interests, but Nietzsche demands in his own way a commitment to
the truth. Think of two old adages: One, ‘what you don’t know won’t hurt you’; the other,
‘forewarned is forearmed’.  Of these two proverbs, Nietzsche likes the second. Human
beings have very little capability to plan their future, so if we use history for this purpose,
we have a weak reed. But in addition, the glorification of, or nostalgia for, the past is
dangerous.  Human  thoughtlessness  and  gullibility  fill  the  pages  of  history  books.
Ruthlessly critical history liberates us from the past. We don’t learn from history how to
do better.  We rather learn that its  study will  not help us very much in the present.
Missteps,  fools  and  foolishness,  madmen,  and  human-made  disasters  inevitably  fill
human history. We need to eschew hero-worship of the past or reliance on such worship
in  the  present.  Good  history  will  rather  help  us  to  concentrate  on  our  present
achievements; we have got to act on our own. Mastery of history will leave us more clear-
eyed about the present -- clear eyed in the sense that we know we cannot rely much on
our forbearers.   In this  diminished learning it  seems that  we learn but  only that  we
cannot learn and that we must do it ourselves. We can escape the past or overcome it.
With enough critical history, we will be able to master our fate. 
33 In my own view, our understanding of the use of history ought to be even more minimal
than  this  minimalist  view  I  have  attributed  to  Nietzsche.  Historians  write  about
continuity and change. Understanding the past involves comprehending the unique locus
of people in their world but also their connection to aspects of human life that we can
describe as trans-temporal and trans-cultural. If we study Abraham Lincoln or Woodrow
Wilson, we may be interested in their peculiar difficulties but also in the nature of the
institutions that make war and in the feelings of helplessness unrelated to participation
in the Civil War or World War One per se, but perhaps part of the human condition.
Lincoln  and Wilson had their  own peculiar  stories,  but  their  tale  also  has  enduring
features -- work, struggle, despair, triumph. 
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34 We  identify  some  dimensions  of  our  historical  accounts  with  our  own  lives  and
simultaneously contrast the histories with our own lives. History thus forms a species of
self-knowledge.   History tells  us about ourselves by telling us our likenesses and our
unlikenesses from others; who we are, who we are not. I would even go so far as to say
that history gives us reflective self-knowledge.  It provides us with a sense of our place in
the world and instructs us that we may not have unique passions, that while our anguish
is our burden, it will not endure forever. We find in history a discipline of reason that can
make us celebrate, or weep. 
35 This  sort  of  knowledge,  however,  has  never  usefully  predicted anything of  value,  or
helped control the future in the slightest,  and at the present time shows no signs of
having such ability. And this sort of knowledge does not help to make our lives morally or
materially better. For this reason some committed social scientists believe that history as
actually practiced is trivial or “merely” entertaining. This aspect of historical knowledge
does in fact resemble the movies and professional sports, though studying history has a
deeper  and  more  durable  sort  of  entertaining  quality.   History  constitutes  a  ‘higher
entertainment’. It has a certain civilizing quality like the opera or the drama. 
36 Indeed,  I  would  not  make  much  of  a  distinction  between  written  history  and  what
appears in some movies or documentaries. The film Thirteen Days (on the Cuban Missile
Crisis) might trouble historians as history. But although it ‘represents’ the past in a way
different from the way that a good book on the Missile Crisis does, the film has problems
because  it  ignores  and  misuses  evidence.  Filmmakers  in  Hollywood  or  the  History
Channel in the United States usually have more an interest than professional historians in
selling a product and less interest in telling the truth about the past. This does not make
the filmmaker much different from some popular historians, who have done estimable
work and have a substantial value. 
37 Social-science inspired critics may argue correctly, and the future may bring a new sort
of history that will have a prominent place in upgrading our life, and assisting statesmen
and decision makers with their deliberations. Nonetheless, much of our grasp of the past
intimates that the urge to reconstruct and control the political and social side of human
life has the character of a noble dream. Moreover, we may say something positive for the
sort of reflective self-consciousness that the history we have has generated. It can afford
hope in a time of trouble and a measure of humility in time of pride.  I do not find these
minor virtues. They do at least suggest that historians might do better at what they are
supposed to do -- examining the past -- if they gave up trying to do what they are not
suited to do -- pontificate about the heavy dilemmas of the present.  There is something
to be said for adhering to an ethic of complexity instead of one of strident moralism. 
NOTES
1.. I have found philosophical accounts of this issue constricted and not
helpful to historians. The issue of the Journal of Philosophy fof March 2007(104,
number 3) is devoted to collective intent.
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2.. Arthur Danto’s book on the philosophy of history, Analytical Philosophy of
History, originally published in 1967 has many instructive and compelling
things to say on this topic. There is a revised edition of the book, Narration
and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), but only the first
twelve chapters, which comprise the original volume, remain crucial. 
3.. In Reason in History (1837) in the translation by Robert S. Hartman
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979), p. 44. 
4.. In  Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality,
1914-1917  (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007),  Robert Tucker
has an outstanding survey of the historical scholarship on Wilson. 
5.. See Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 64-65, 100-01.
6.. This is one point of his essay, usually translated into English as “The Use
and Abuse of History, ” which I have used in the pamphlet of that name
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1957), 2nd rev. ed.
7.. An excellent source for examining this literature from 2003-2007 is Tony
Smith’s A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the
Betrayal of the American Promise ( New York: Routledge, 2007). The book also
exemplifies the confusion in conflating historical analysis with an inclination
to make policy statements. 
8.. For an example of this sort of history, written with the present in mind,
see Greg Behrman,  The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time
When American Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007).
9.. In addition to Nietzsche in the previous work cited, the view I sketch below
may be found in David Hume and Benedetto Croce. For the latter see Croce’s 
History as the Story of Liberty (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1941,
1970), p. 19; History: Its Theory and Practice (New York: Russell and Russell,
1960; from the 1st Italian ed., 1916), pp. 12-14, 51; and My Philosophy and Other
Essays… (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 198.  For Hume I am indebted to
an unpublished essay by Frederick van Holthoon, “Hume and the End of
History,” an analysis of Hume’s History of England, pp. 10-11. 
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